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ECOLOGY AND COMMUNITY 
Suzanne Keller* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What do the following dates have in common: August 4, 1978; 
March 28, 1979; December 3, 1984; and April 26, 1986? Each refers 
to a humanly caused environmental disaster that stunned the world. 
It would be easy to criticize, with retrospective wisdom, the obvious 
failures that each incident represents, but that is not my goal. My 
objective is to see what these calamities can teach us about individual 
and collective responses to environmental crises. 
II. THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 
At first glance, Love Canal, Three Mile Island, Bhopal, and Cher-
nobyl would seem to have little in common, differing as they do in 
region, culture, and history. As one examines the record, however, 
striking similarities stand out in regard to not only the traumas that 
occurred in these places, but also the impact of the incidents on local 
residents, the response of the authorities, and the views of the 
experts. 
The post-accident reactions of government authorities are typi-
cally slow and evasive. In these four cases, deceit and denial were 
prevalent, as were false reassurances, patronizing attitudes, and 
frequent resort to scientific jargon that obscured rather than enlight-
ened. The first official response in each case was to discount the 
magnitude of the accident and thereby minimize the human suffering 
that it engendered. 
Another characteristic that these environmental disasters shared 
was the experts' overconfidence in technical infallibility: an attitude 
• Professor of Sociology, Princeton University. Ph.D., 1955, Columbia University. Professor 
Keller is an expert in local community organization. 
623 
624 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:623 
that blocked any immediate, human response to the panicked pop-
ulation. A 1975 report by General Electric articulated this attitude, 
stating flatly that the chances of a severe accident at a nuclear 
reactor "were one in a million years." (Gould 1990: 139) At Three 
Mile Island, both industry representatives and federal regulators 
previously had officially dismissed the likelihood of multiple system 
failure as preposterous. (Walsh 1988: 34) As a result, during the first 
day after the accident, "utility and [Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC)] officials played down its seriousness, insisting there was no 
threat of radiation releases into the atmosphere." (Walsh 1988: 35) 
Because we do not anticipate such accidents, we cannot effectively 
prepare for them or respond to them. The assumption of technolog-
ical infallibility, not surprising in a technocratic civilization, prevents 
not only the policymakers but also the actors at the scene from 
anticipating a breakdown. In a crisis, their first response is to decry 
the danger, if not cover it up altogether, and cite statistical proba-
bilities that deny the events that have occurred. In this way, tech-
nological overconfidence can lull even responsible officials into a 
refusal to heed evidence. Confident in their formulas, the experts 
refuse to believe that these or the machinery they generated might 
fail. Thus, at Chernobyl, the engineers, many of whom would later 
die in agony, did not believe the readings of the very instruments 
they had created, the radiation monitors. 
Yet technology did and often does fail. It fails because of designs 
that are "not forgiving of mistakes" (Marples 1988: 22), because of 
human error, or because of too vast a distance between centralized 
policymakers and on-site managers. In the aftermath of Chernobyl, 
for example, Moscow did not grasp the full impact of the disaster 
until it dispatched a team of experts to the site to see for themselves. 
Only after the experts' return did the Soviet government sound a 
general alarm. 
What Chernobyl and other major environmental accidents clearly 
indicate is that self-managing technology does not yet exist. Even 
more important, it has become clear that technology never "acts" on 
its own, for human fallibility can overcome any design and human 
error undermine any safeguard. (Haynes & Bojum 1985: 203) To 
underscore this point, we should note that all the major accidents at 
civilian nuclear facilities to date have been the result of human error: 
a category that contains a wide range of Pandoran ills including 
outright negligence, irresponsibility, overwork, fatigue, insufficient 
training, carelessness, and managerial neglect. Take poor manage-
ment. At Chernobyl, the plant's deputy director fled right after the 
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accident, and shockingly, the electrical engineer in charge of one 
experiment had had "no training in nuclear engineering." (Bethe 
1991: A25) 
In addition to institutional failings, there are moral delinquencies. 
Reports of deceit and bribery both of and by safety inspectors, 
equipment monitors, and government officials appear again and 
again in the dossiers. Still, no one seems to make any allowance for 
these in developing large-scale projects or implementing advanced 
technologies. Eventually all of these factors-the experts' overcon-
fidence, human error, moral limitations, and official blind spots-
prove extremely costly to both scientists and citizens. 
III. THE DEVASTATION 
A select, powerful few may formulate policy in the world's inner 
sanctums, but environmental disasters affect many thousands and 
tens of thousands of ordinary people in local communities. The Love 
Canals and Chernobyls have an overwhelming impact on the regions 
and populations that bear the brunt of miscalculation, mismanage-
ment, and malfeasance by those in charge. 
In addition to physical damage and danger, there is the pervasive 
disruption of life, habitat, and home that follows an environmental 
disaster. After the Three Mile Island accident, about 144,000 people 
within a fifteen-mile radius from the nuclear power plant abandoned 
their houses for several days, not because of a government order 
but because of the panic that rumor and speculation generated. In 
Pripyat, near Chernobyl, fifty thousand people-eventually to num-
ber about 135,000-were evacuated a few days after the explosion 
by 1100 buses to "nowhere". 
Moreover, long after the initial crisis has passed, its aftermath 
lingers. There is the gnawing anxiety over one's health, the health 
of one's family, and, given the typically regional impact of such 
disasters, the health of one's neighbors. Deeper and more insidious 
is the erosion of confidence in Science, Authority, and Expertise and, 
at times, in life itself. For example, after the scope of the crisis at 
Love Canal became evident, and officials closed the local schools, 
the area's residents became frantic. Their whole world threatened 
to collapse. The word "home" suddenly aroused fear rather than 
security. (Levine 1982: 184) Because they could neither sell their 
houses nor just leave, residents felt trapped and overcome by a 
sense of irreparable loss. Individuals felt abandoned, with nowhere 
to go to. They became desperate for information as they waited for 
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announcements that never came, and felt unable to protect their 
children or take care of their families. What is more, as is true for 
certain illnesses that make people shy away from contact with the 
afflicted, friends and neighbors now hesitated to visit. As suspicion 
grew, the flow of community and neighborhood life was permanently 
disrupted. (Barringer 1991: 28--39, 74) 
Perhaps the most serious consequence of major environmental 
accidents, from a sociological viewpoint, is the ensuing decline in 
respect for authority in science and politics. Survivors of these ac-
cidents discredit the scientific elite for both its technical failures and 
its self-righteous arrogance. They resent the political authorities for 
their incompetence, deception, and disparagement of the public. 
Typically, there is outrage at the long delays by officials in respond-
ing to the emergency. Moreover, what the officials finally offer is 
generally too little and too late. Gorbachev made a terse official 
statement forty-three hours after the accident at Chernobyl and 
went on national television with a fuller statement a full sixteen days 
later. At Love Canal, the state government dismissed the newly 
formed citizens' groups with these words: ''We deal with physical 
facts, not with social and political matters." (Walsh 1988: 34) 
When the authorities fail to respond, it increases the collusion that 
citizens perceive exists between scientists and governments. The 
perception of collusion is bolstered by the secrecy that generally 
surrounds the nuclear power industry: a near-silence that engenders 
rumor, speculation, and profound distrust among members of the 
public. At Three Mile Island, for example, both the utility company 
and NRC officials tried to diminish down the seriousness of the 
accident and withheld important information from the public. (Walsh 
1988: 34) These dynamics create feelings of abandonment, of having 
been forsaken. The ensuing tension stokes residents' already high 
stress levels, which the authorities, although apprehensive about the 
possibility of collective panic, do little to alleviate. Eventually, fear 
and despair mobilize the citizens for intense political action. 
IV. GRASSROOTS POLITICAL ACTION 
Official mishandling of an environmental disaster and its aftermath 
has led to a political awakening in many a previously apathetic 
population. Three months after the crisis at Love Canal, about six 
hundred residents formed the Love Canal Homeowners Association. 
In their eyes, they were but "blameless victims of the disaster" who 
had to "stick together and take care of ourselves." (Levine 1982: 
1992] BELLAGIO CONFERENCE 627 
177) In this way, the residents recreated that "confidence that holds 
a society together." (Gould 1991: 137) 
Local political activism takes two basic forms. On one hand, it 
may consist of a series of defensive maneuvers, expressed as a 
communal turning inward or a closing of ranks against outsiders. On 
the other hand, it may result in political outreach and the creation 
of networks and programs addressed to the wider society. 
A. NIMBY: The Turning Inward 
Environmental disasters tend to engender a special kind of "Not 
in My Back Yard" (NIMBY) response. NIMBY usually refers to a 
rejection of undesirable would-be neighbors. Postdisaster NIMBY s, 
however, refer to the rejection of perceived sources of danger such 
as landfills, hazardous waste disposal sites, microwave towers, nu-
clear power plants, and a wide range of other stigmatized facilities. 
(Edelstein 1988: 170) NIMBY represents an obverse of the "tragedy 
of the commons," in which private interests override and destroy 
the common good. The so-called "reverse commons effect" sees the 
common good served at the expense of those groups compelled to 
bear a disproportionate share of toxic risk. (Edelstein 1988: 185) In 
this context, a community's refusal to cooperate attests to the pow-
erful role that psycho-social factors play in decisions with environ-
mental implications. At stake is not just the community's physical 
integrity but its image and its reputation as safe or dangerous. 
(Edelstein 1988: 6) 
Stigma thus plays a dual role, initially as a source of a sense of 
isolation and abandonment and subsequently as a source of commu-
nity cohesion. Whatever the other bases of community-geographi-
cal, political, or social-"the discovery of a toxic threat provides a 
basis for a new and shared identity that effectively defines a com-
munity of interest among those residing within the boundaries of 
contaminations." (Edelstein 1988: 6) 
In this regard, it is interesting to consider the difference between 
natural and humanly caused disasters. Both create victims, and both 
leave stress, loss, and disruption in their wake. In humanly caused 
disasters, however, it is the loss of control over a technology hereto-
fore trusted that proves unnerving-whereas natural disasters are 
seen as unpredictable acts of God, unfathomable and beyond human 
control. (Edelstein 1988: 7) In the case of humanly caused disasters, 
then, people can fiercely blame the agents they consider responsible. 
Moreover, whereas religion may help people cope with natural di-
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sasters by offering shared explanations and perceptions, technolog-
ical failings lack a place in this common framework and thus allow 
conflicting perceptions to hold sway. This fragments not only the 
explanations of what has occurred, but individuals' means of coping 
with it. All of this plays a role in the possible mobilization of local 
public opinion. 
B. Political Outreach: The Mobilization of Local Residents 
Environmental disasters make people aware and frustrated but 
usually are not sufficient to promote a widespread mobilization. 
(Walsh 1988: 58-60) Such organizing requires, in addition, a notable 
collective distrust and resentment of government authorities and 
technical experts, and support from leaders in business, religion, 
and the media. In the four cases that this paper examines, residents 
of the affected areas came to view the disastrous events not simply 
as unfortunate corporate or political mistakes but as "injustices" that 
had to be put right. 
As is generally true for grassroots movements, the leaders in those 
cases came from unexpected places. At Love Canal, for example, it 
was a young mother, inexperienced and even disinterested in poli-
tics, who took the lead. She soon was joined by several hundred 
others who worked day and night for two and a half years to obtain 
justice. Perhaps because of their experience with community, women 
are often central actors in local environmental activism. Many come 
to display leadership skills they never knew they possessed. It is 
also interesting to note that evacuees are much more likely to become 
activists than those who remain in the polluted or endangered area. 
These new activists enlist their followers in town meetings, rallies, 
public debates, and political campaigns. In time, separate consti-
tuencies develop, each with its own special agenda: old versus young, 
renters versus owners. Overall, however, one unifying theme pits 
the people against the powers, the Davids against the Goliaths: the 
attainment of a safe and healthy environment. 
Thus do local communities become critical forums for citizens' 
protests. One novel twist on the more traditional form of community 
activism is that environmental activism on the local level focuses not 
on deprived or marginal groups, but on advanced technologies and 
those scientists and political officials who in reality are responsible 
for making globally significant decisions. (Walsh 1988: 1) In addition, 
a split between citizens and scientists often polarizes many commu-
nities. The two operate with very different assumptions and defini-
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tions of environmental risk-scientists tend to view risk in narrower, 
technical terms, whereas citizens usually emphasize its broader, 
moral dimensions. Citizens also anticipate possible failures of design, 
whereas scientists generally expect their designs to perform as 
planned. In this way, a sense of technological powerlessness may 
fuel a powerful ecological grassroots movement. 
Inequitable access to technical information is another divisive 
force. This is true even in democracies, where citizens' limited access 
to the information they need to make intelligent judgments about, 
for example, the siting of a chemical plant in their community ren-
ders their formal options and choices something of a sham. (Walsh 
1988: 62) The hierarchy that places the minority of experts over the 
citizen majority puts citizens at a distinct disadvantage, most visibly 
after a calamity. It is not by chance, then, that after the Bhopal 
disaster, Congress enacted the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. 11001 et seq., despite intensive 
lobbying against it. The law's sponsors stated that its aim was to 
support citizens' "absolute, fundamental right to know what goes 
into the air their kids breathe, the water they drink, and the ground 
they play on." (Schneider 1991: 65) 
Knowledge and access to essential information are central tenets 
of the social movements that ecological crises have spawned. Grass-
roots ferment has accelerated despite civil lawsuits to discourage 
citizen protest and rearguard actions by corporations unwilling to 
bear their share of environmental responsibility-responsibility 
mandated, for example, by the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 or "Superfund" law. 
(Bishop 1991: B9) Indeed, grassroots activism culminated in the most 
powerful political protest movement of the postwar era: the Greens. 
The Greens' conspicuous success, first in Germany, has inspired 
citizens to compel local and national establishments to take notice in 
many countries. In essence the Greens and their offspring worldwide 
have sought to make economics subordinate to ecology. They aspire 
to a postmaterial ethos of decentralization, nonviolence, limits on 
growth, and ecological balance. (Graff 1983: 56) Most fervently, they 
proclaim the need for a new philosophy of life, one based on respect 
for long-term vitality rather than immediate comforts and profits. 
In this, the Greens clearly collide with traditional goals of capitalist 
development. They propose taking the "soft path" in energy use, 
including phasing out fossil fuels; reducing consumer demand, one 
of the mainstays of late capitalism; and banning ecologically destruc-
tive projects such as constructing and operating airports and su-
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perhighways because of their heavy demands on natural resources. 
(Graff 1983: 59) 
Accordingly, making tradeoffs has become a fundamental issue for 
local communities. Which is to have top priority: protection from the 
risk of contamination or unemployment, higher taxes or a lower 
standard of living? To those who say that contamination is the price 
we must pay for "the good life" twentieth-century style (Edelstein 
1988: 193), the Greens reply that individuals in the developed world 
must examine the philosophy by which they live. They must ac-
knowledge that theirs is a consumer society driven by materialism 
and a venality too reluctant to acknowledge the ecological price of 
technological advance. Even the victims of disaster continue to think 
not in terms of deeper values but in terms of technical "quick fixes" 
and of how to manipUlate the system rather than rethink and re-
structure it. An ethic of self-interest, however, ultimately leads to 
an acceptance of pollution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Just before coming to this conference, I attended a discussion on 
national environmental regulations and the petrochemical industry 
in Louisiana. One remark in particular has stayed in my mind. A 
local oil industry worker asserted that what happens at the national 
level with regard to environmental policies and regulations has vir-
tually nothing to do with what happens out in the field. Why not? 
Because the oil industry fights environmental legislation tooth and 
nail, and because the workers see waste and pollution as less of a 
threat than unemployment and reduced profits. They do not deny 
the existence of pollution, but they accept the "engineering fallacy" 
that it simply needs to be cleaned up. This conventional wisdom-
that pollution is fundamentally a technological problem-supports 
the collusion that sustains our wasteful society. (Edelstein 1988: 193) 
Focusing on cleanups, health testing, and economic compensation 
for victims avoids challenging the system's propensity to toxicity 
and thus avoids change. That, however, is what must happen. The 
real goal should not be NIMBY but NIABY-Not in Anyone's Back 
Yard. (Edelstein 1988: 196) 
Therefore, in addition to various concrete proposals to help pre-
serve the environment-tax rebates, incentive plans, and regulatory 
measures-we need to reconsider the philosophies by which we live. 
For the long run, nothing short of a new, collective ethic is needed. 
For the short run, some practical policies already are taking effect 
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to mitigate the worst environmental abuses and safeguard nature 
for the generations to come. 
Silent Spring, the influential book by Rachel Carson, signalled the 
existence of the current emergency thirty years ago. A decade later 
the Club of Rome sounded another alarm world-wide. Such alarms 
have become commonplace, but remedies remain elusive, and Faus-
tian dilemmas proliferate. For example, the N ew York Times re-
cently carried the following offer: $4.2 million in benefits to any rural 
community in upstate New York, the benefits to include a new town 
park as well as funds for the library, the fire department, road 
improvements, and higher education. Add to this the approximately 
$1.5 million per year in new taxes and fees that would result, and 
the lure should prove irresistible. Ah, but there was a tradeoff-in 
return for accepting this offer, the town would have to agree to be 
home to a dump for low-level radioactive waste. Given the current 
financial crunch, authorities from several towns expressed interest. 
Their populations, however, were up in arms and polarized almost 
at once, with one group urging "yes to progress" to the other group's 
"just say no": pitting friend against friend and neighbor against 
neighbor. 
Such dilemmas are likely to mUltiply in the future as environmen-
tal controls become unavoidable. For example, every state in the 
United States now is under a federal mandate to find room for storing 
its waste within its borders. Courts increasingly are assessing the 
respective liabilities of industry, municipalities, and citizens, with 
cities and towns arrayed against industrial firms and governmental 
agencies in the battle over who is to pay what for past transgres-
sions. Progress, however, is slow. Only sixty-three of the thousands 
of waste sites across the United States have been cleaned up in the 
past eleven years, at a cost of about $11.2 billion. 
We must view these facts too in a broader context. As long as we 
define the problems as the responsibility of others, to be avoided by 
the clever manipUlation of available loopholes, there will be no com-
prehensive framework to guide this vast undertaking. Moving on to 
solutions and implementation rather than stopping at diagnosis, here 
are my modest suggestions. The next steps must occur at three 
levels: the legal-political, the technological innovation-related, and 
the psycho-cultural. 
The legal-political dimension should draw on new legislation, reg- . 
ulatory measures, fines, and incentives not to abuse the environ-
ment. The technological dimension must look to the development of 
more advanced technologies that would be not only more efficient, 
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reliable, and "smarter" but also more ecologically sensitive and 
aware. The scientist Freeman Dyson would divide technology into 
"gray" and "green". "Gray technology" is the familiar one of motors, 
circuits, and mechanics, while "green technology" involves engi-
neering to restore ecosystems, grow food, and create new environ-
ments. Dyson expects green technological predominance within fifty 
years. Such environmentally advanced technologies will be able to 
repair and renew the earth and put a halt to ozone depletion, the 
destruction of forests, the spread of deserts, and the erosion of the 
elemental bases for life and growth. Finally, the psycho-cultural 
aspect, although critical, is the most elusive, for it targets the most 
difficult changes of all: changes in values, belief systems, and per-
spectives on life and its perceived necessities. 
To move from Not in My Back Yard to Not in Anyone's Back 
Yard is no mere play on words. It demands a new ethic, an ethic of 
concern for one's neighbor as one's self, and the recognition that 
there is no poisoning of just one well. As poet Andrei Voznosesky 
sensed in Thoughts on Chernobyl, "[w]hen the robot failed to switch 
off tragedy,/ a man stepped into that radiant block./ Because of that 
man, we both stayed alive,/ you and I .... " 
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